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In	this	book,	Nicola	Lacey	develops	some	of	the	major	themes	in	her	work.	She	explains	
how	 ideas	 of	 criminal	 responsibility	 in	 the	 last	 250	 years	 have	 been	 shaped	 by	
institutions,	 interests	and	the	social	 functions	of	criminal	 law	and	punishment.	Typical	
for	 Lacey,	 is	 the	multidisciplinary,	 socially	 grounded	 jurisprudential	 approach.	 As	 she	
admits	 in	 the	 preface,	 this	 book	 is	 as	much	 about	 analysing	 criminal	 responsibility	 as	
about	proposing	a	pluralist	methodology,	which	she	calls	‘reflexive	jurisprudence’.		
	
The	book	consists	of	six	chapters.	The	first	chapter	introduces	the	pluralist	methodology	
and	 contains	 a	 preliminary	 analysis.	 Lacey	 explains	 why	 an	 analysis	 of	 criminal	
responsibility	 requires	 more	 than	 a	 focus	 on	 its	 conceptual	 contours	 and	 moral	
foundations	 (what	 it	 is).	 Equally	 important	 is	 understanding	 criminal	 responsibility’s	
social	 role,	 meaning	 and	 functions	 (what	 it	 is	 for)	 (p.	 2).	 She	 then	 proceeds	 by	
explicating	 three	 core	 assumptions	 that	 underlie	 her	 analysis.	 First,	 that	 criminal	
responsibility	 fulfils	distinctive	roles:	of	 legitimation	and	coordination.	Legal	doctrines	
and	underlying	 ideas	of	 responsibility,	 serve	 to	 legitimate	 criminal	 law	as	 a	 system	of	
state	power.	This,	 in	 turn,	 is	 a	 condition	 for	 criminal	 law’s	power	 to	 coordinate	 social	
behaviour.	This	proposition	had	already	been	presented	by	Lacey	in	2001	in	a	paper	in	
the	Modern	 Law	 Review1	and	 is	 one	 of	 the	 major	 ideas	 underlying	 the	 analysis.	 The	
second	 assumption	 pertains	 to	 the	 contextual	 aspects	 that	 influence	 the	 conceptual	
contours	 and	 the	 role	 of	 criminal	 responsibility:	 ideas,	 interests	 and	 institutions.	
Responsibility,	according	to	Lacey,	has	to	be	understood	in	the	context	of	a	more	general	
pattern	and	practice	of	criminalization,	incorporating	all	stages:	articulation	of	offences,	
investigation,	 diversion,	 prosecution,	 trial,	 sentencing,	 the	 royal	 prerogative	 and	 the	
execution	of	punishment.	Placing	criminal	 responsibility	within	 the	broader	context	of	
criminalization	 makes	 that	 the	 analysis	 of	 criminal	 responsibility	 is	 historically	 and	
system	 specific.	 It	 follows,	 then,	 that	 different	 attribution	 principles	may	 co-exist	 and	
play	 a	 role	 in	 interpreting	 criminal	 responsibility.	 The	 co-existence	 of	 different	
conceptions	 of	 responsibility	 at	 particular	 times,	 and	 in	 particular	 places,	 is	 the	 third	
assumption	that	underlies	Lacey’s	analysis.		
	 	
In	the	chapters	two	to	four,	each	of	the	three	contextual	aspects/influences	that	feature	
in	 the	subtitle	 -	 ideas,	 interests	and	 institutions	 -	are	discussed.	The	structure	of	 these	
chapters	 follows	 a	 similar	 pattern;	 the	 first	 part	 discusses	 the	 contextual	 aspect	 itself	
while	the	second	part,	through	case	studies,	illustrates	the	importance	of	the	contextual	
factor	at	particular	points	in	modern	English	legal	history.		
Chapter	 two	 starts	 with	 setting	 out	 four	 discrete	 ideas	 that	 underpin	 the	
principles	 and	 practices	 of	 responsibility-attribution	 in	 England	 and	 Wales:	 capacity,	
character,	 outcome	 and	 risk.	 The	division	of	 attribution	principles	 into	 the	 groupings:	
capacity,	 character	 and	 outcome	 is	 not	 new	 as	 is	 the	 agreement	 that	 attribution	 of	
criminal	responsibility	often	follows	a	combination	of	these	principles.		Lacey,	however,	
adds	 a	 fourth:	 attribution	 through	 risk-responsibility	 by	 pointing	 to	 the	 practices	 of	
																																																								
1	N.	Lacey,	 ‘In	Search	of	the	Responsible	Subject:	History,	Philosophy	and	Criminal	Law	Theory’,	
Modern	Law	Review	(2001),	350-371.	
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preventive	 criminalization	 that	 emerged	 in	 the	 late	 twentieth	 and	 early	 twenty-first	
century.2		
The	 capacity	 theory,	 which	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 the	 period	 of	 the	
Enlightenment,	is	premised	on	the	idea	of	agency,	of	choice	and	personal	autonomy.	The	
character	theory,	which	has	been	influential	in	criminal	law	discourse	through	the	work	
of	Michael	Bayles3	and	 Lacey’s	 own	work4,	 is	 premised	 on	 the	 idea	 that	 causing	 harm	
expresses	 a	 person’s	 usual	 character.	 The	 outcome-theory	 is	 founded	 on	 the	 harm	
principle.	 Criminal	 responsibility	 is	 attributed	 because	 the	 defendant	 caused	 a	 public	
harm;	 an	 outcome	 proscribed	 by	 the	 criminal	 law.	 Risk-based	 responsibility	 grounds	
criminal	responsibility	on	the	assessment	of	risk	(in	clinical	or	actuarial	terms).		
In	 the	 second	 part	 of	 the	 chapter	 (case-studies),	 Lacey	 considers	 the	 broader	
cultural,	 intellectual	 context	 in	 which	 the	 attribution-principles	 developed.	 She	
discusses	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 individual	 and	 the	 state,	 the	 understanding	 of	
selfhood,	 religion,	 gender,	 and	 developments	 in	 psychological	 and	 social	 sciences.	
Multiple	conceptions	of	 responsibility	have	co-existed	at	various	 times	 in	England	and	
Wales.	 Capacity	 responsibility	 plays	 a	 dominant	 role	 in	 attribution	 of	 responsibility	
while	risk,	outcome,	and	character-based	assessment	play	a	role	in	the	prosecution	and	
sentencing	stages	(bad	character	evidence).	
Chapter	 three	 looks	 at	 how	 shifting	 interest	 and	 power	 relations	 impact	 upon	
criminal	 responsibility.	 The	 interests	 that	 have	 been	 most	 influential	 are:	 economic	
power	(shifting	patterns	of	inequality	appeal	to	attribution	based	on	stereotypes	of	bad	
character),	 professional	 power	 (legal,	 medical	 and	 ‘psy’	 professions	 impact	 on	
conditions	 of	 criminal	 responsibility),	 cultural/symbolic	 power	 and	 the	 power	 of	 the	
media	(power	to	legitimize	and	delegitimize	particular	ideas	of	responsibility),	political	
power	(“tough	on	crime”	policies).	In	the	second	part	of	the	chapter,	on	the	case-studies,	
Lacey	 mentions	 concrete	 examples	 of	 how	 interest	 impacts	 on	 attribution-principles.	
For	 instance,	 a	 change	 in	 government	 power	 since	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 and	 the	
process	of	industrialization	accounts	for	an	expansion	of	summary	jurisdiction	(creating	
‘regulatory	crime’	as	opposed	to	 ‘real	crime’)	and	the	emergence	of	strict	 liability.	The	
latter	leads	to	prominence	of	outcome-responsibility	to	the	detriment	of	character,	and	
capacity	responsibility.	In	a	fascinating	analysis,	 in	which	she	engages	in	a	debate	with	
George	Fletcher,	Lacey	analyses	how	the	modern	 law	of	 theft	has	been	 influenced	and	
shaped	 by	 the	 changing	 interests	 of	 a	 capitalist	 economy.	 She	 further	 discusses	 the	
increased	scope	of	criminalization,	driven	by	political	interests.	This	has	lead	to	(i)	pre-
inchoate	 and	 preventive	 offences	 (terrorism)(ii)	 the	 creation	 of	 hybrid,	 civil-criminal	
offences	 (ASBO)	 and	 (iii)	 criminalization	 beyond	 the	 formal	 area	 of	 criminal	 law,	 e.g.	
immigration	 detention.	 Lacey	 concludes	 the	 chapter	 by	 noting	 that	 an	 increase	 in	
criminalization	 leads	 to	 a	 growing	 social	 polarization,	 a	 growing	 social	 and	 economic	
inequality,	increased	individualism	and	the	stigmatizion	of	certain	groups.		
Chapter	 four	 discusses	 how	 institutional	 structures	 that	 serve	 the	 legitimation	
and	coordination	of	 criminal	 responsibility	 influence	 responsibility-attribution.	During	
the	 period	 under	 consideration	 (eighteenth	 century	 until	 now),	 criminal	 justice	
institutions,	shifted	from	a	system	of	lay	justice	to	a	system	dominated	by	professionals:	
lawyers	 and	 police	 officers.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 with	 the	 centralization	 of	 the	 state	
apparatus,	criminal	justice	became	a	core	tool	of	governance.	Painting	in	broad	strokes	
Lacey	 links	 the	 economic	 and	 social	 restructuring	 of	 the	 1970s,	 which	 lead	 to	
abandoning	 penal	 welfarism	 and	 a	 tougher	 stance	 on	 crime,	 to	 a	 change	 in	
responsibility-attribution.	 The	 balance	 between	 capacity	 and	 outcome	 responsibility,	
which	 had	 come	 to	 displace	 character	 responsibility	 during	 the	 late	 eighteenth	 and	
																																																								
2	A.	Ashworth	and	L.	Zedner,	Preventive	Justice,	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2014.	
3	Michael	Bayles,	‘Character,	Purpose	and	Criminal	Responsibility’,	I	Law	and	Philosophy	(1982),	5	
–	20.	
4	Nicola	Lacey,	State	Punishment.	Political	Principles	and	Community	Values,	65-68	(Chapter	3).	
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nineteenth	centuries,	persisted	throughout	the	twentieth	century	but	has	recently	been	
accompanied	by	a	revival	of	character	responsibility	(as	a	result	of	focusing	on	risk).	The	
section	on	case-studies,	 consists	of	 two	parts.	 In	 the	 first	part,	Lacey	explains	how	the	
institutional	 features	 of	 the	 eighteenth	 century	 criminal	 process	 (cases	 heard	 in	
localities	 (pubs)	 not	 courts,	 by	magistrates	 not	 judges,	 a	 highly	 decentralized	 system	
featuring	local	variation)	lent	themselves	to	the	attribution	of	responsibility	on	the	basis	
of	 an	 assumption	 of	 bad	 character.	 The	 second	 part	 discusses	 how	 the	
professionalization	 and	 systematization	 of	 criminal	 justice	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	
lead	 to	 the	 rise	 of	 capacity	 and	 outcome	 responsibility.	 The	 professionalization	 of	 the	
legal	profession	and	the	centralization	of	the	criminal	justice	system,	however,	enabled	
the	trial	to	function	as	a	forum	for	investigation	and	proof	of	capacity-responsibility.	A	
decisive	 change	 of	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 criminal	 trial	 was	 the	 “infiltration”	 of	 defence	
lawyers	 in	the	course	of	the	nineteenth	century	(p.	122).	Professionalization,	however,	
came	with	a	lack	of	legitimation	since	there	persisted	a	strong	and	deep-rooted	feeling	
that	 the	 definition	 of	 crime	 and	 proof	 of	 guilt	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 common	 sense.	
Professionalization,	 on	 the	other	hand,	 lead	 to	 a	 refinement	of	 criminal	 law	doctrines,	
which	 catered	 to	 the	 conception	 of	 capacity	 responsibility.	 Lacey	 then	 links	
professionalization	in	the	nineteenth	century	and	the	subsequent	legitimation	problem	
to	 the	 process	 of	 democratization	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century:“[o]nce	 those	who	 decried	
the	power	of	the	lawyer	started	to	have	more	political		power	through	the	ballot	box,	the	
criminal	 law’s	 legitimation	problem	 reduced	as	 a	 result	 of	 the	possibility	 of	 according	
technical	definitions	of	crime	the	imprimatur	of	democratic	origins”.	(p.	134).		
	
The	 last	 two	 chapters	 are	 of	 an	 evaluative	 nature.	 Chapter	 five	 brings	 together	 the	
analysis	set	out	in	chapters	two	to	four	and	offers	an	interpretation	of	the	trajectory	of	
criminal	 responsibility	 in	English	 law.	Chapter	 six	discusses	 the	pluralist	methodology	
and	its	implications	for	legal	theory	and	legal	scholarship.			
In	 chapter	 five,	 Lacey	makes	 clear	 that,	while	multiple	 conceptions	of	 criminal	
responsibility	 have	 coexisted,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 move	 through	 four	 configurations	 of	
responsibility,	that	she	refers	to	as	‘eras’:	(i)	the	era	of	(bad)	character,	which	refers	to	
the	 eighteenth	 and	 early	 nineteenth	 century	 where	 the	 criminal	 trial	 was	 based	 on	
attribution	via	concepts	such	as	‘malice’	since	it	could	not	yet	manage	evidence	of	mens	
rea	(because	of	lay	justice,	speedy	trials,	lack	of	legal	argumentation)	and	where	the	trial	
was	no	more	than	an	opportunity	for	exculpation.	(ii)	The	era	of	transition,	which	refers	
to	 the	partial	 eclipse	of	 character	 responsibility	 and	 the	 rise	of	 capacity	 responsibility	
through	 the	 development	 of	 doctrinal	 conceptions	 of	mens	 rea	 and	 individual	 agency	
and	 the	 rendering	 inadmissible	 of	 character	 evidence	 (but	 that	 never	 really	
disappeared).	At	the	same	time,	the	regulatory	ambition	of	the	state	resulted	in	the	rise	
of	outcome	responsibility.	(iii)	The	dual	track	era,	where	the	gradual	construction	of	the	
welfare	 state	 brought	 with	 it	 responsibility-attribution	 via	 capacity	 and,	 for	 certain	
regulatory	 offences,	 outcome	 responsibility	 and	 where	 character	 responsibility	 was	
displaced	 to	 the	 prosecution	 and	 sentencing	 process.	 (iv)	 The	 era	 of	 resurgence	 of	
character	 responsibility	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	 risk	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 increasing	
politicization	of	criminal	justice	and	an	intensified	focus	on	security.			
Lacey’s	 analysis	 shows	 that	 despite	 the	 controversy	 that	 exists	 over	 character	
responsibility,	 certainly	 since	 the	 rise	 of	 human	 rights,	 it	 never	 really	 disappeared	 in	
English	law.	In	fact,	 it	enjoys	a	revival	 in	the	twentieth	and	twenty-first	century	with	a	
focus	 on	 security	 and	 risk-management.	 Examples	 of	 this	 resurgence	 are,	 the	
widespread	 operation	 of	 reasonableness	 standards,	 extended	 concepts	 of	 accomplice	
liability	via	membership	(joint	enterprise	liability	leaning	towards	guilt	by	association),	
liability	standards	that	turn	on	motive	(terrorism)	and	the	use	of	character	as	evidence	
(previous	 convictions	 as	 proof	 of	 bad	 character).	 An	 interesting	 aspect	 of	 Lacey’s	
analysis	of	 the	resurgence	of	character	responsibility	 is	 the	suggestion	that	 it	could	be	
the	 product	 of	 the	 diminished	 confidence	 in	 the	 ability	 of	 courts	 to	manage	 capacity-
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based	judgments:		“In	a	scientifically	knowing	world	in	which	we	cannot	truly	be	sure	of	
defendants	truly	had	the	capacity	to	do	otherwise	than	they	did,	 it	may	be	tempting	to	
renew	our	hold	on	older	ideas	of	rights	and	wrong,	good	and	evil,	hence	reconstructing	a	
criminal	process	which	is	more	explicitly	oriented	to	the	moral	evaluation	of	character”	
(p.	171).	
In	 the	 last	 chapter,	 Lacey	 takes	 the	 opportunity	 to	 discuss	 the	 merits	 of	 a	
pluralist	methodology	 and	 the	 implications	 of	 this	 approach	 for	 special	 jurisprudence	
(concerned	 with	 conceptual	 analyses	 of	 criminal	 responsibility)	 and	 general	
jurisprudence.	This	is	the	most	important	part	of	the	book.	As	Lacey	admits,	the	analysis	
of	 responsibility	 in	 English	 law	 is	 a	 case	 study	 for	 arguing	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 pluralist	
methodology.		
Lacey	 starts	 by	 discussing	 the	 critique	 of	 a	 pluralist	 methodology	 as	
undermining	 the	 normative	 value	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 capacity	 responsibility,	 which,	
premised	on	the	idea	of	agency,	 is	grounded	in	the	Enlightenment	and	as	such	broadly	
endorsed	 in	modern	 legal	discourse.	The	 significance	of	 legal	doctrine,	 she	 rebukes,	 is	
equally	 determined	 by	 its	 descriptive	 and	 explanatory	 power.	 In	 a	 pronouncement	
capturing	 the	 core	 of	 the	 book,	 Lacey	 submits:	 “there	 is	 a	 core	 to	 the	 idea	 of	
responsibility,	a	core	related	to	the	idea	of	human	agency	and	accountability	for	conduct	
which	acts	 as	 a	 constant	 thread	amid	 shifting	 theories	of	 responsibility	over	 time	and	
space.	 But	 this	 core	 is	 a	 relatively	 small	 one,	 and	 the	 inflection	 which	 it	 is	 given	 by	
varying	social	and	 institutional	conditions	and	practical	 imperatives	 is	so	decisive	that	
no	theorist	of	criminal	responsibility,	can	afford	to	ignore	it”.	(p.	187).	After	all,	criminal	
responsibility	 is	 an	 idea	 which	 is	 located	 within	 a	 social	 practice	 of	 criminalization,	
which	itself	is	embedded	in	an	institutional	framework	and	is	shaped	by	its	dual	role	of	
legitimation	and	coordination.		
In	the	part	on	implications	of	her	methodology	for	general	jurisprudence,	Lacey	
enters	 into	 a	 dialogue	 with	 John	 Gardner,	 who	 has	 criticized	 her	 methodology	 as	
undermining	 general	 jurisprudence.	 Unlike	 Lacey,	 who	 accepts	 the	 idea	 that	 law	
changes	 because	 of	 its	 changing	 social	 function,	 Gardner	 is	 of	 the	 view	 that	 law’s	
modality	 is	 independent	of	 its	 function	 and	 can	be	 taken	as	 an	 analytical	 given.	 Lacey	
challenges	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 single	 unchanging	 concept	 of	 law.	 This	 approach	 has	
implications	for	legal	scholarship	and	jurisprudence	and	Lacey	calls	on	legal	theorists	to	
preserve	 openness	 to	 revising	 a	 legal	 concept.	 She	 concludes	 by	 proposing	 the	 use	 of	
‘reflexive	 jurisprudence’,	 rejecting	 the	 idea	 that	 legal	 scholarship	 is	 autonomous	 and	
operating	from	the	premise	that	there	 is	an	 interplay,	a	reflexive	relationship	between	
legal	rules	and	doctrines	and	ideas	and	institutional	influences.		
	
Nicola	Lacey’s	book	is	a	must	read	for	anyone	interested	in	criminal	responsibility	and	
jurisprudence.	The	importance	of	her	analysis	of	criminal	responsibility	and	her	plea	for	
a	 pluralist	 methodology	 for	 jurisprudence	 stretches	 far	 beyond	 English	 law	 and	 legal	
scholarship.	Born	and	bred	in	a	continental	legal	system,	heavily	influenced	by	German	
Doktrin,	 I	 found	 myself,	 invigorated,	 inspired	 and	 challenged	 by	 this	 book.	 Lacey’s	
pluralist	 approach	 and	 proposed	 reflexive	 jurisprudence	 aligns	 with	 an	 interest,	 or	
should	 I	 say	 frustration,	 over	 scholarship	 on	 criminal	 responsibility	 in	 the	 area	 of	
international	 criminal	 law	 (ICL).	 Scholarship	 in	 this	 field	 illustrates	 how	 an	 internal	
doctrinal	 approach	 and	 elegant	 philosophical	 conceptualizations	 fail	 to	 explain	 and	
legitimize	 criminal	 responsibility.5 	Adhering	 to	 a	 theory	 of	 capacity	 responsibility,	
comporting	with	principles	of	agency	and	the	notion	of	‘control’,	ICL	scholarship	fails	to	
explain	 the	 concept’s	 nature,	 which	 in	 fact	 leans	 towards	 character-attribution,	 thus	
creating	 a	 ‘disconnect’	 between	 theory	 and	 practice.	 The	 dominance	 of	 doctrinal	
analysis	comes	with	a	blind	spot	for	the	dual	role	of	responsibility	(as	legitimation	and	
																																																								
5	E.	van	Sliedregt,	‘International	Criminal	Law:	Over-studied	and	Underachieving?’,	Leiden	Journal	
of	International	Law,	2016,	6-9.	
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coordination)	and	 institutional	and	 interests	 factors	 influencing	 the	nature	of	 criminal	
responsibility.	 Claiming	 capacity-attribution	 to	 what	 looks	 more	 like	 character-
attribution	 distorts	 legal	 reality,	 harms	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 international	 criminal	
institutions	and	makes	the	concept	of	criminal	responsibility	a	contested	concept	with	
dubious	theoretical	underpinnings.	The	problem	with	this	closed	doctrinal	approach	is	
that	in	the	end	it	may	harm	the	exact	normative	values	it	studies	and	aims	to	protect.	I	
found	Lacey’s	analysis	of	risk-responsibility,	enemy	criminal	law	and	the	resurgence	of	
character	 responsibility	 particularly	 insightful,	 and	 her	 call	 for	 legal	 scholarship	 that	
looks	beyond	doctrinal	and	philosophical	analyses,	most	persuasive.	
The	 only	 critique	 one	 could	 have	 of	 the	 book	 is	 that	 its	 layered	 structure,	
employing	 different	 frameworks	 and	 levels	 of	 analysis	 (dual	 role	 of	 criminal	
responsibility	 (legitimation-coordination);	 ideational	 frames;	 case	 studies)	 makes	 it	 a	
meandering	 read	 in	 parts.	 Moreover,	 because	 of	 its	 rich	 and	 concise	 analysis,	 mainly	
developed	 in	 previous	work,	 the	 book	 is	 not	 easily	 read	 as	 a	 stand-alone	monograph.	
This	 does	 in	 no	 way	 detract	 from	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 work.	 To	 the	 contrary,	 this	
monograph	 should	 be	 seen	 as	 the	 epitome	 of	 Lacey’s	 work	 in	 the	 ambit	 of	 criminal	
responsibility	and	jurisprudence.	I	echo	Andrew	Ashworth’s	praise	of	the	book6:	 it	will	
rank	as	a	major	scholarly	work	of	our	time.		
	
	
	
																																																								
6	A.	Ashworth,	‘General	Editor’s	Introduction’,	p.	x.		
